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Abstract
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteigers (2004) extends Rabins (1993) theory of reciprocity
in a dynamic sense, introducing a rule of revision for players beliefs. The Sequential
Reciprocity Equilibrium [SRE] they dene can be dynamically inconsistent. In this arti-
cle it is argued that such dynamic inconsistency is not intrinsically related to issues of
reciprocity, but rather to the particular way the beliefsupdating process is modeled. A
renement of the SRE, which is both dynamically consistent and, it is argued, more sound
to assumptions usually made in the literature of information economics and philosophy,
is proposed.
Keywords: Reciprocity Dynamic Consistency.
JEL classication: A13; C70; D63
1. Introduction
Whithin the by now vast eld of Behavioral Economics,1 an interesting hint
has been put forward by theories of reciprocity, pioneered by Rabin (1993). The
key point in Rabins theory of reciprocity is that a persons kindness depends on
The present work was part of my undergraduate dissertation at Bocconi University, Milan
(2004). Im deeply grateful to my advisor, prof. Pierpaolo Battigalli. I also thank Giuseppe
Cappelletti for helpful comments.
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his intentions: a certain behavior is not necessarily kind nor unkind; its kindness
depends on the consequences that it is supposed to produce, according to the
beliefs held by who is displaying that behavior. This is the meaning of kindness
as an intention-driven concept.2 The explicit role for playersintentions requires
the use of psychological games, as developed by Geanakoplos et al.(1989, GPS
henceforth).
More recently, Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004, DK hereafter) have ex-
tended Rabins theory of reciprocity in a dynamic sense: as the play unfolds,
players update their beliefs, and their "reciprocational attitude" is a¤ected by
such a learning process. The dependence of playerspreferences on the updated
beliefs makes DKs go beyond GPSs theory of psychological games: in the latter,
only initial beliefes are allowed to have a direct e¤ect on payo¤s. Indeed, besides
extending Rabins theory of reciprocity to a dynamic environment, DKs is also the
rst paper in which the logic of the psychological games is extended to encompass
truly dynamic beliefs.3
The way DK pursue such an extension of the theory, with the denition of
the Sequential Reciprocity Equilibrium [SRE], leads to at least one curious result,
as emphasized by DK themselves: the SRE may be dynamically inconsistent.
Dynamic inconsistency is another central topic in Behavioral Economics, and it
has been extensively studied.4 It seems natural then to investigate whether there
is a direct relation between reciprocity and dynamic inconsistency, and to isolate
the origin of the dynamic inconsistency which arises in DKs model.
In this article it is argued that the dynamic inconsistency of DKs model is not
intrinsically related to issues of reciprocity, but rather to the particular way the
beliefsupdating process is modeled. A renement of DKs SRE, which is both
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dynamically consistent and, it is argued, more sound to assumptions usually made
in the literature of information economics and philosophy, is proposed. Thus, the
purpose of this note is twofold: rst, to put in evidence that the source of the
dynamic inconsistency in DKs model is not reciprocity per se, but rather specic
implicit assumptions about the underlying epistemic model; second, to propose an
equilibrium renement that is more consistent with standard models in information
economics.
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 introduces
the basic notation and DKs theory of reciprocity; section 3 presents DKs SRE
and the dynamic inconsistency is briey discussed; in section 4 the Perfect-SRE is
introduced, and its existence and dynamic consistency are proved; in section 5 we
explain the intuition behind the new equilibrium concept, and its relations with
contributions in literature of economics and philosophy.
2. DKs Theory of Sequential Reciprocity and basic notation.
Following Rabins example, DKs theory of reciprocity consists of a "psycho-
logical extension" of a traditional dynamic game with perfect information, that
we call material game. The material game is a dynamic game with perfect infor-
mation, denoted by a tuple   = hN;H;Z; (Ai; i)i,5 where N is the set of players,
H the set of partial histories, Z the set of terminal histories. For each i 2 N; Ai
represents the set of feasible actions of i and, for each h 2 H, Ai (h) represents
the set of feasible actions at h.
For each i 2 N , we denote by Si  [Ai]H the set of is pure strategies and
by Bi  [ (Ai)]H the set of his behavioral strategies. Let B := i2NBi and
B i := j 6=iBj . For any h 2 H, si (h) represents the pure action si prescribes at
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h, and by i;(h) (ai) the probability that the behavioral strategy i assigns to the
action ai at h. Therefore, 8h 2 H;i;(h) 2  [Ai (h)].
For each player i 2 N , the material payo¤ function is dened as the ex ante
payo¤function: i : B ! R (payo¤s depend on the prole of behavioral strategies).
Playersbehavior will be represented by behavioral strategies. A behavioral
strategy can be interpreted as an array of conditional beliefs about playersbe-
havior at the partial histories. Thus, the set of rst order beliefs of player i about
player j are dened as T 1i;j := Bj . Let be T
1
i := j 6=iT 1i;j the set of player is
rst order beliefs about the behavior of all his opponents. Furthermore, the set
of second order beliefs of player i about what player j believes about player ks
behavior is dened as T 2i;j;k := T
1
j;k = Bk.
As anticipated, in order to overcome GPSs and Rabins static frameworks,
DK introduce a beliefsrevision rule. In order to cope with this, more notation is
needed.
For each h 2 H, let Si (h) be the set of is (pure) strategies consistent with
the history h. Also, letting l (h) denote the length of h, i.e. the number of action
proles whose concatenation yields h, dene, for each i 2 N and h 2 H:
B
(h)
i : =
n
i 2 Bi : 8

a1; :::; al(h) 1

 h;
8k = 1; :::; (l (h)  1) ; i;(a1;:::;al(h) k 1)

al(h) 1

= 1
o
In words, in B(h)i there are only those behavioral strategies that prescribe the
pure actions leading to h.at all the nodes on the path to h.
The basic intuition of DKs model of beliefsupdating is the following: as the
play unfolds and history h is reached, players update their beliefs shifting to more
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pure beliefs. If at the beginning of the game they assigned a certain probability
distribution to actions to be taken at histories on the path to h, once h has been
reached they update their beliefs so to assign probability one to the actions actually
taken by other players on the way through h, leaving their own beliefs over the
playersbehavior at the unreached histories unchanged. The same occurs for their
beliefs about other playersbeliefs as well. In terms of the notation above, for
each h 2 H, player i updates his rst order beliefs about j shifting from elements
ij 2 Bj to elements i;(h)j 2 B(h)j .6 Thus, the following denition of the belief
revision policy is introduced (see DK):
Denition 1 For each player is initial behavioral strategy i 2 Bi  B(;)i , and
for each h 2 H, the updating rule yields a shift from i to (h)i 2 B(h)i , which is
such that:
1. 8h0  h; (h)i;(h0) (si (h0)) = 1, where si 2 Si (h) :
2. 8h00  h; (h)i;(h00) = i;(h00):
The following example may help to understand the denition above. Consider
the game in gure 1: suppose that at the the beginning of the game (at history ;)
player 2s rst order beliefs are represented by the following behavioral strategy:
2;;1 =
D
2;;1;; = pA+ (1  p)B

;

2;;1;(B;s) = qC + (1  q)D
E
According to this model, if historyB occurs, player 2s beliefs about 1s strategy
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must be:

2;(B)
1 =
D

2;(B)
1;; = B

;


2;(B)
1;(B;s) = qC + (1  q)D
E
:
Note that such a belief revision rule is somewhat resembling to a form of
Bayesian updating. Indeed, if it is 0 < p < 1, the updating rule is actually
a Bayesian one. But it is something more, since it determines a rule of beliefs
revision also for the case in which p = 1 and B is reached, that is, conditional
on zero probability events. In the language of modal logic and philosophy, DKs
model of belief revision is consistent with the so called conservativity principle,
which states that: <<when changing beliefs in response to new evidence, you
should continue to believe as many of the old beliefs as possible>> (Harman
(1986): p.46, cited in Battigalli and Bonanno (1999): p.156).7
The last bits of notation are directly related to the concept of reciprocity :
as in Rabin (1993), DK dene kindness functions as mappings from each players
"behaviors and intentions" to R. This captures the idea of kindness as an intention-
driven concept. The following concepts are needed:
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 The set of player is Pareto e¢ cient strategies:
Ei : =

i 2 Bi : @0i 2 Bi s.t. 8h 2 H;8 i 2 B i;
j
 
0i;  ijh
  j  i;  ijh for each j 2 N;
with strict inequality for some j; h;  i
	
:1
When a player chooses a strategy i 2 Bi, given his beliefs ~
i
 i 2 B i about
othersstrategies, he actually chooses a prole of payo¤s among those in the set


~
i
 i

:=

j

i;
~
i
 i

j2N
: i 2 Bi

. Thus, any strategy i 2 Bi should
he choose, he would assign a payo¤ of j

i;
~
i
 i

to player j.
 The equitable payo¤ for player j, given is belief i i, is:
ej

i i

=
max

j
 
i; 
i
 i

: i 2 Bi
	
+min

j
 
i; 
i
 i

: i 2 Ei
	
2
The equitable payo¤ is used as a reference point to evaluate is kindness to
j. This is made through the denition of the kindness function: according to the
same logic introduced by Rabin, player is kindness to player j depends on his rst
order beliefs and measures the distance between the payo¤ player i "assigns" to
j and the equitable payo¤. Thus:
1For each h 2 H, and for each  i;  i 2 Bi B i, it is, for each j 2 N :
j
 
i;  ijh
  j (h)i ; (h) i  :
Since Si  Bi, the meaning of j
 
si;  ijh

is clear too.
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 the kindness function of i to j is a function i;j : Bi  T 1i;j ! R s.t.:
8i 2 Bi;8i i 2 T 1i;j ;
i;j
 
i; 
i
 i

= j
 
i; 
i
 i
  ej  i i :
 The perceived kindness fuction is dened shifting one step up in the hierarchy
of beliefs, and represents how a player believes his opponents are being kind
to him. Thus, it is represented by the function i;j;i : T 1i;j  T 2i;j; j ! R s.t.:
8i i 2 T 1i;j ;8i;ji 2 T 2i;j; j ;
i;j;i

ij ; 
i;j
 j

= i

ij ; 
i;j
 j

  ei

i;j j

:
In words, the kindness i perceives from j depends on what i believes j is doing
(ij 2 T 1j is a rst order belief of i about j), and on what i thinks j believes
about the behavior of all the players other than j (i;j j 2 k 6=jT 2i;j;k  T 2i;j; j
are second order beliefs of player i).
 We are ready now to specify the "psychological" utility function that DK use
to dene their game of sequential reciprocity, that is:
8i 2 N;ui: Bi
Y
j 6=i
0@T 1i;j Y
k 6=j
T 2i;j;k
1A s.t.:
ui
 
i;

ij ;

i;jk

k 6=j

j 6=i
!
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= i

i;
 
ij

j 6=i

+
X
j 6=i
Yi;j 
h
i;j
 
i; 
i
 i
  i;j;i ij ; i;j ji (1)
(Yi;j)j 6=i are xed and exogenous parameters, representing the sensitivity of
player i to his reciprocation to j.
Thus, the Dynamic Reciprocity Game introduced by DK is dened as:
Denition 2 The Dynamic Reciprocity Game obtained from the material game
  = hN;H;Z; (Ai; i)i is a tuple  R = hN;H;Z; (Ai; ui)i in which the "psycholog-
ical" utility functions (ui)i2N are dened as above.
3. The Sequential Reciprocity Equilibrium and the Dynamic Inconsis-
tency.
DKs idea of sequential reciprocity is that at each history, players take into
account the kindness as evaluated according to the beliefs updated at that history.
Thus, is kindness to j at history h will be given by the function i;j
 
i; 
i
j jh
 
i;j


(h)
i ; 
i;(h)
j

. Equivalently, the perceived kindness taken into account will be
i;j;i

ij ; 
i;j
 j jh

 i;j;i


i;(h)
j ; 
i;(h);j;(h)
 j

.
Thus, DK introduce the following equilibrium concept, which is meant to cap-
ture such an idea of sequential reciprocity, in which updated beliefs play a direct
e¤ect:
Denition 3 (The Sequential Reciprocity Equilibrium) The prole of be-
havioral strategies

~i

i2N
is a "Sequential Reciprocity Equilibrium" [SRE] if
8i 2 N;8h 2 H :
1. ~i (h) 2 argmaxi;h2[Ai(h)] ui
 
~ini;h;

~
i;(h)
j ;


i;(h);j;(h)
k

k 6=j

j 6=i
!
.8
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2. ~
i;;
j =
~j for all j 6= i:
3. ~
i;;;j;;
k =
~k for all j 6= i; k 6= j:
Let RDK be the set of such SREs for  R:
Conditions 2 and 3 in the previous denition require nothing but the correct-
ness of the initial beliefs, both of rst (condition 2) and of second order (condition
3): this is a standard equilibrium requirement, also common to GPSs notions
of equilibrium for psychological games. The key point of DKs model is condi-
tion 1: having xed the equilibrium-consistent initial beliefs, the updated beliefs
are obtained, at each history, through the belief revision policy discussed above.
What condition 1 introduces is in fact a criterion of sequential rationality which
is directly referred to the updated beliefs. Thus, DKs SRE is such that, for each
history, players have no incentive to unilateral one-shot deviations, provided that
reciprocity is evaluated according to the the beliefs held at that history.
The denition of the equilibrium as immune to one-shot deviations is crucial:
as DK themselves point out, the one-shot deviation principle [OSDP] fails in their
model, meaning that the SRE dened above, <<[...] does not exclude the possi-
bility that a joint deviation at several [histories] might increase a players utility as
evaluated at the rst [of the histories] where the player deviates>> (cit., DK). The
failure of the OSDP prevents the applicability of backward induction arguments.
Nonetheless, DK provide an existence result (see the Theorem in DK).
Intuitively, the source of the dynamic inconsistency of playerspreferences is
quite obvious: since in a psychological game playerspreferences depend on their
beliefs, and since playersbeliefs change as the play unfolds, playerspreferences
may change as well. In fact, what condition 1 entails is that players have, at each
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history, a di¤erent objective function. The SRE indeed entails a sort of multi-self
model.
An example might be useful to understand how DKs SRE works, and in par-
ticular how the dynamic inconsistency arises.
Example 4 Consider the game in gure 1: it will be shown that if player 1 is
enough "reciprocity-concerned" (that is if Y1 is high enough), the strategy prole
h(AD) ; (s)i is an SRE of the game. If so it is, because of conditions 2 and 3 the
candidate initial equilibrium beliefs must be: 1;;2 = (s) and 
2;;
1 = (AD), while the
second order beliefs are 1;;;2;;1 = (AD) and 
2;;;1;;
2 = (s). Given these beliefs, it
is easy to see that at the rst node player 1 prefers A over B: because of his beliefs
1;;2 = (s) and 
1;;;2;;
1 = (AD), 1 interprets 2s action s as "fair" (neither kind nor
unkind: it is f 01;2;1 (AD; s) = 0), so that he is interested only in material payo¤s,
and so he prefers the terminal history (A) over the terminal history (B; s;D) (the
one which would be reached, given 2s strategy (s) and given the action D prescribed
by 1s candidate equilibrium strategy at the other node where he is active). At the
second node, where 2 is active, the belief revision policy prescribes that 2s beliefs
are 2;(B)1 = (BD) and 
2;(B);1;(B)
2 = (s). Thus, player 2 interprets 1s action A
as unkind behavior, so that both for material and for "reciprocational" concerns
he prefers s over d. At the leftmost node, player 1s beliefs must be 1;(B;s)2 = (s)
and 1;(B;s);2;(B;s)1 = (BD). With such beliefs, 1 interprets 2s behavior as an
unkind one, in that choosing s and accordig to what 1 believes 2 thought, player 2
assigned to 1 a payo¤ of  1 instead of one of 5 (which would have been reached
had 2 chosen d). Thus, if player 1 is enough "reciprocity-concerned" (namely, if
it is Y1 > 1), at the last node he is willing to give up a payo¤ of 2 for one of
 1, in order to reciprocate 2s unkind behavior lowering 2s payo¤ from  2 to
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 3. That is, choosing D over C at the last node. Because of the denition, we
have proved that the strategy prole h(AD) ; (s)i is indeed an SRE of the game in
gure 1. Furthermore, such an SRE exhibits a problem of dynamic inconsistency:
given the equilibrium initial beliefs, at the rst node 1 thinks 2s kindness to him is
zero, so that he would like to deviate from (AD) to (BC) to increase his material
payo¤ from 0 to 2 (thus, the equilibrium prole is not robust respect to "multistage"
deviations). The dynamic inconsistency arises in that, if player 1 chooses B at
the rst node, and then (given 2s strategy (s)) the rightmost node is reached, he
doesnt perceive 2s strategy (s) as fair anymore, but as an unkind one, and hence
he will reciprocate choosing D at (B; s), i.e. punishing 2s unkind behavior.
It should be clear from this example that the basic source of the OSDP failure is
the fact that player 1 interprets his opponents strategy (s) as fair at the beginning,
and as unkind at the rightmost node. The unkindness of 2s (s) when 1 is at (B; s)
is clear: the pattern of beliefs entails that 1 thinks 2 chooses for him a payo¤ of
 1 instead of one of 5. But why does, at the initial history, 1 perceive the same
action as fair? The reason is that at the beginning of the game 2s initial beliefs
are 2;;1 = (AD): given these beliefs, player 2 simply cannot be neither kind nor
unkind. In fact, the logic of the kindness functions is such that, for given beliefs of
a player, we compare the payo¤ prole that a strategy of his own "chooses" with
the others that are feasible according to his beliefs about the opponents. So, if 2
initially believes that his node will not be reached, he has actually no choice at
all, and so, no opportunity to be neither kind nor unkind. Thus, in DKs model,
if player 2 initially believes that 1 will play A, we are not able to distinguish, in
terms of kindness, 2s strategies (s) and (d). Hence, a rst drawback of the SRE
is that it does not allow a complete kindness ranking of the strategies: in general
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it is not possible to make a kindness comparison among strategies that di¤er from
each other only at histories reached with zero probability. Notice that such an
incompleteness of the kindness ranking of strategies would not be an issue in a
completely mixed strategy prole.
Another consequence of the SRE notion is that the kindness of a strategy
is evaluated, at each history, according to the beliefs every player holds at that
history, and not according to the beliefs he would hold at the histories in which he
actually displays the actions purposed by his strategy (see condition 1 in the SREs
denition): despite the updating rule, DK treat the beliefs held at every history
in isolation, without relating them to those held at the subsequent nodes. On the
contrary, it seems natural to argue that since a players strategy is a contingent
plan of action, for all histories that might conceivably occur, its kindness should
be considered as a contingent matter as well. Thus, the kindness of an action
prescribed by a strategy at a given history, should depend on the beliefs that
the player would have at that history. Under standard epistemic assumptions, a
player that holds certain beliefs knows what he would believe at any node, whether
his beliefs assign positive or zero probability to that node being reached. In the
example above, 2s strategy (s) represents his disposition to act at B; but since
at B he would never believe A, this means that the strategy (s) indeed represents
2s disposition to act at B, believing that B has occured. A notion of sequential
reciprocity consistent with this kind of observations would not exhibit the kind
of inconsistency discussed in the example above. Thus, the real source of the
dynamic inconsistency in DKs equilibrium notion is in their model of treating
beliefs, rather than in something peculiar to the psychological nature of the game.
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4. Dynamic Consistency and the Perfect-SRE.
The previous example showed the non validity of the OSDP for the Dynamic
Reciprocity Game à la DK. In the following it is introduced a renement of DKs
SRE that solves the problems of dynamic inconsistency, and an existence result is
provided. The next section will discuss possible interpretations of such an equilib-
rium concept, and some related literature.
The following denition are necessary:
Denition 5 Given a Dynamic Reciprocity Game à la DK
 R =


N;H;Z; (Ai; ui)i2N

, we dene the "-perturbed game of  R as the dy-
namic reciprocity game which is identical to  R but in which, each player i 2 N
can only choose such that 8h 2 H; i (h) 2 " [Ai (h)] where it is:
" [Ai (h)] := fi 2  [Ai (h)] : 8ai 2 Ai (h) ; i (ai)  "g :
A test sequence for  R is a sequence of "-perturbed games of  R for "! 0.
Denition 6 (The Perfect-SRE) A prole of behavioral strategies  is a Per-
fect Sequential Reciprocity Equilibrium [P-SRE] of a Dynamic Reciprocity Game
à la DK  R, if it is the limit point of a sequence of SREs for a test sequence of
 R. Let RP be the set of such P-SREs of  R:
The following theorem guarantees the existence of the P-SRE:
Theorem 7 (P-SREs Existence) Under the continuity assumptions of DKs
Theorem, there exists a P-SRE for every Dynamic Reciprocity Game  R.
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Proof. The existence of the sequence of SRE is guaranteed by DKs existence
theorem, applied to each perturbed game  "n of  R in the test sequence ( "n)n1.
The compactness of the strategy space, together with the continuity assumptions,
guarantees the existence of an accumulation point for the sequence of SREs of the
games in the test sequence, hence of a P-SRE as we have dened it.
The following theorem proves that the P-SRE is indeed a renement of DKs
SRE:
Theorem 8 Every P-SRE of a Dynamic reciprocity Game  R is a SRE of it:
RP  RDK
Proof. All we have to prove is that a sequence of SRE of a test sequence ( "n)n1
for  R converges to a SRE of  R: by denition, a sequence (n)n1 is a sequence
of SRE of a test sequence for  R if and only if , 8n  1;8i 2 N;8h 2 H :
ni (h) 2 argmaxi;h2"n [Ai(h)] ui

ni ni;h;
 
nj ; (
n
k )k 6=j

j 6=i jh

and for all j 6=
i i;;j = j , and for all j 6= i; k 6= j (i;;);(j;;)k = k.
Note that 8n > m in a test sequence, "m [Ai(h)]  "n [Ai(h)], therefore,
8n > m, 8h 2 H,
ui(
njh)  ui(nni;hjh), 8i;h 2 "m [Ai(h)].
If ui is continuous, then the inequality holds also taking limits for n!1:
ui(
jh)  ui(ni;hjh), 8i;h 2 "m [Ai(h)], for each h 2 H.
Such an inequality holds for every m. For all h 2 H, the closure of the union
of all "m [Ai(h)] is  [Ai(h)]. This, together with the continuity of ui yields:
ui(
jh)  ui(ni;hjh) 8i;h 2  [Ai(h)], for each h 2 H.
For each i 2 N , it yields nothing but the denition of the SRE for  R.
Finally, the following theorem states the validity of the OSDP for the P-SRE:
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Theorem 9 (OSPD for P-SRE) If  is a P-SRE, then it holds (under the
usual continuity assumptions):
8i 2 N;8h 2 H :
(i jh) 2 arg max
i2Bi(h)
ui
 
i; 

 ijh

Proof. Ab absurdo, 9i 2 N : 9h0 2 H;90i 2 Bi (h) :
ui
 
0i; 

 ijh0

> ui (
jh0) :
But, if so it is, by the continuity assumption (ui is continuous in all its arguments)
it must be that, for a "-perturbed game  " in the test sequence ( "n)n1 for  
(where for each n  1; ^"n is the SRE of  "n and such that limk!1

^
"n

k1
=
) and close enoughto  , we have
ui

0i; ^
"
 ijh0

> ui

^
"jh0

;
which contradicts the fact that ^
"
is a SRE in  ".9
Corollary 10 The set RP of the P-SREs of a dynamic reciprocity game à la DK
is the subset of RDK in which the equilibrium prole is dynamically consistent.
With reference to the game in gure 1, an example of such an equilibrium is
given by the strategy prole h(BD) ; (s)i. It is immediate to prove that it is a SRE,
in which the reciprocation occurs at each history as prescribed by DKs denition.
But it is also easy to see that it is dynamically consistent: now, since player 1
thinks that 2 believes B, at both nodes where he is active 1 perceives 2s behavior
as unkind, so that given 2s strategy s, player 1 wants to "punish" player 2 since
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the beginning of the game, that is to induce the terminal history (B; s;D). With
such patterns of beliefs, and hence of perceived kindness, player 1 has no incentive
to deviate anymore.
5. The P-SRE: interpretation and related concepts.
The belief revision policy introduced by DK can be cast into the family of the
KB-frame models representing the paradigm in economics of information. Besides
the conservativity principle already mentioned above, standard assumptions in
that literature are the following: a) individuals always believe what they know;
b) individuals always know their own beliefs. In a dynamic learning process, as
a dynamic game is, these assumptions imply that an individual holding certain
beliefs knows what he would believe, should a certain information be provided to
him, whether such information is initially believed as possible or not. This is the
dynamic positive introspection property of beliefs.10
In the section 3 it has been pointed out that the notion of reciprocity entailed
by DKs SRE may not allow a complete ranking of a players strategies, in terms
of kindness. Such an incompleteness derived from the impossibility of comparing
strategies di¤ering one from the other only in actions taken at zero-probability
histories. It has been argued that also o¤-the-equilibrium behavior should matter
in the evaluation of a players kindness, so that the kindness of a players strategy
should be evaluated according to the beliefs that player would hold when taking the
actions prescribed by that strategy. The dynamic positive introspection property of
beliefs discussed above provides a strong argument in favor of what counterfactual
beliefs should be considered, and why they should matter. The P-SRE introduced
in the previous section deals with all these three issues in a unied way.
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As commented above, the logic of the kindness functions in DK entails a com-
parison of the outcomes that are feasible according to the playersbeliefs, and the
outcome actually realized by a given strategy, so that in general it is not possible
to make a kindness comparison among actions taken at histories reached with zero
probability. Indeed, in case of completely mixed behavioral strategy proles, so
that there are no unexpected histories, DKs model has none of the drawbacks
discussed above. In particular, the problem of dynamic inconsistency disappears,
together with the incompleteness in the ranking of the strategieskindness.
The problem at hand is analogous to that studied by Blume et al. (1991a,b),
who develop a decision theoretic model in which there exist no Savage null events,
but in which the notion of zero probability is saved. The corresponding of the
Savage null events here would be the strategies whose kindness players cannot
distinguish because they di¤er only in actions taken at zero-probability histories.
Blume et al.(1991a) solve the problem developing a non-Archimedean decision the-
ory that applies to lexicographic probability systems to represent agentsbeliefs,
and their counterfactual beliefs (i.e. those that would be held after zero-probability
events). In a similar fashion, one might consider a model of reciprocty in which ties
in the kindness evaluation that are due to conditionalizations to zero-probability
events are broken thanks to a lexicographic structure of the kindness functions,
that directly reects the lexicographic structure of beliefs both on and o¤-the equi-
librium path, i.e. also with respect to the counterfactuals. As shown in the work
of Stalnaker (1996, 1998), equilibrium concepts such as Seltens perfect equilib-
rium can be seen as a shortcut to represent a model of sequential rationality in
a non-Archimedean decision theoretic framework, that dispenses with the use of
lexicographic probability systems to represent counterfactual beliefs (see Blume et
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al., 1991b, on the latter point). Analogously, the notion of P-SRE can be inter-
preted as a shortcut for a model of sequential reciprocity that applies DKs notion
of reciprocity to a lexicographic probability system, used to evaluate kindness at
o¤-the-equilibrium histories using as counterfactual beliefs those consistent with
the dynamic positive introspection property.
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